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Dispositional accounts of free will provide a promising avenue for compatibilists about 
free will and determinism to respond to manipulation arguments, but requires an adequate 
account of masked and finkish abilities. In this thesis, I argue that an account of masked 
dispositions that addresses the context sensitivity, gradability, and dispositional quality of masks 
can allow dispositional compatibilists to level viable responses to various manipulation 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Dispositional accounts of free will such as Kadri Vihvelin’s (2004; 2013) offer a 
promising method for compatibilists to respond to manipulation arguments such as Derk 
Pereboom’s (2001; 2014) and require further attention than they have so far garnered. Pereboom 
has argued that causal determinism, the thesis that all future events are necessitated by prior 
events and the laws of nature, precludes the possibility of free will and moral responsibility by 
means of a series of thought experiments. In this thesis, I develop Vihvelin’s response to 
Pereboom and defend it against possible objections. 
I will argue that free will and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism. 
Other compatibilists have argued that particular conditions are necessary for free will. Pereboom 
argues that a manipulated agent controlled by malicious neuroscientists can satisfy any and all 
proposed compatibilist conditions for free will and yet still not be morally responsible. 
Ultimately, Pereboom argues, the best explanation for why manipulated agents who satisfy all 
compatibilist conditions for free will are not morally responsible is because their decisions and 
actions are causally determined. Further, because there is no difference relevant to moral 
responsibility between a manipulated agent and a causally determined agent, Pereboom argues, 
causally determined agents are also not free. 
Pereboom proposes a series of analogies between decreasingly controlled agents who 
purportedly do not differ with respect to moral responsibility. Because each agent in Pereboom’s 
thought experiment lives in a deterministic universe, their actions are causally determined. I 
argue that Pereboom’s argument fails, and that free will and moral responsibility are compatible 
with causal determinism. Each case is set up such that Plum is supposed to satisfy any and all 




White dead, and each ultimately kills White. In the first case, Plum1 is actively manipulated by 
neuroscientists who change his reasoning process such that he chooses to kill White. In the 
second case, Plum2 is designed by neuroscientists at birth such that it is causally determined that 
he will kill White when the opportunity arises. Plum3 is raised in an environment in which his 
egoistic tendencies are stoked and develops the characteristics that lead to him being causally 
determined to kill White when the opportunity arises. Plum4 is a normal agent in a deterministic 
universe who reasons egoistically when presented with the opportunity to kill White. Pereboom 
argues that nothing relevant to moral responsibility distinguishes one case from the next and that 
the best explanation for their common lack of responsibility is that all are causally determined by 
forces over which they ultimately lack control. Pereboom’s argument thus rests on two premises: 
(1) there is no difference relevant to moral responsibility between Plum1, Plum2, Plum3, and 
Plum4, and (2) Plum1 is not morally responsible. If the best explanation for why each Plum is 
not responsible is because each is causally determined, then no causally determined agent can 
ever be morally responsible. Compatibilists about determinism and moral responsibility thus 
must reject one of these premises. Those who reject the first premise offer a ‘soft-line’ response; 
those who reject the second offer a ‘hard-line’ response.1 
To defend the compatibility of free will and determinism, I will focus on the conditions 
for masked abilities. According to Vihvelin’s dispositional account of free will, agential abilities 
such as the ability to speak or solve puzzles are complex dispositions. Just as a fragile glass is 
disposed to break when it is dropped, an agent is disposed to make decisions. The stimulus 
condition for a glass’ disposition to break is the glass’ being dropped; the stimulus condition for 
 
1 Both terms are McKenna’s. See McKenna (2006, 2014) for a hard-line response; see 




an agent’s disposition to make decisions is the agent’s trying to make a decision. When the glass 
is dropped and breaks, its disposition manifests; when an agent tries to make a decision and 
succeeds at doing so, their ability is exercised.  
Much in the same way that a glass can still be fragile even if it is wrapped in bubble wrap 
(Johnston 1992), an agent can still be disposed to make decisions even if she is temporarily 
under the influence of something that will prevent her from making decisions. Entities such as 
bubble wrap and malicious neuroscientists with mind control devices are masks (some 
philosophers, e.g. Bird 1998, use the term ‘antidotes’).  
This thesis is structured as follows. In section 2, I discuss the roots of dispositional 
accounts of free will and recent accounts of dispositions. In section 3, I discuss masked abilities 
and Michael Fara’s (2005) analysis of masks. I argue that his analysis is unsuccessful and 
propose a new analysis. In section 4, I use my account of masks to develop a dispositional 
response to Pereboom’s (2001) manipulation argument. I argue that Pereboom’s argument relies 
on comparing agents whose rational abilities are masked to agents whose rational abilities are not 
masked. Plum1’s rational abilities are masked, whether Plum2’s and Plum3’s rational abilities 
are masked depends on how we read the details of each case, and Plum4’s rational abilities are 
not masked. Pereboom’s first premise, that there is no difference between each Plum, is false. In 
section 5, I take on an objection that Pereboom could level against my dispositional response to 
manipulation arguments and argue that his more recent manipulation cases (2014) do not avoid 
the problems with his (2001) cases. In section 6, I argue that my response also addresses Alfred 
Mele’s zygote argument, a modified manipulation argument which Mele argues is able to 






2 COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSES AND THE DISPOSITIONAL ACCOUNT OF 
FREE WILL 
 Kadri Vihvelin’s dispositional account of free will has its roots in classical compatibilist 
accounts. For Vihvelin, agential abilities are “bundles of dispositions” (2004; 2013). Fragility is 
a simple disposition, but the complex dispositions that agents possess, such as the abilities to 
speak and to choose, are combinations of simpler dispositions. An account of agential abilities 
thus requires an account of dispositions; Vihvelin endorses a conditional analysis according to 
which possession of a disposition depends on the truth value of a counterfactual conditional. 
Something is fragile just in case it would break if it were struck; an agent is able to act in some 
way just in case her trying to act in that way would cause her to do so. A glass has a disposition 
(fragility) that manifests when it is exposed to its stimulus conditions (being struck or dropped); 
an agent has an ability (the ability to choose on the basis of reasons) that manifests when the 
stimulus conditions come about (the agent trying to choose). Vihvelin’s account of dispositions 
is well-equipped to address two key problems with other accounts of dispositions: that an entity 
need not exercise its disposition to the same degree each time it is exposed to the relevant 
stimulus conditions and that dispositions are impermanent.  
Classical compatibilists (Hume 1748 and Moore 1912, for instance) argued that an agent 
has free will just in case she would have done otherwise had she decided to do otherwise. 
Determinism thus does not rule out free will; in many cases, causally determined agents would 
have done otherwise had they chosen to do so, which classical compatibilists argue agents are 





Something x is disposed at time t to give response r to stimulus s iff, if x were to undergo 
stimulus s at time t, x would give response r (Lewis 1997: 143). 
According to the SCA, a glass is disposed at time t to break upon being struck or dropped iff, if 
the glass were to be struck or dropped at time t, it would break. Similarly, an agent is disposed at 
some time to act in some way iff, if the agent were to choose at that time to act in that way, she 
would act in that way. But this analysis fails to account for ‘finkish’ dispositions. First discussed 
by CB Martin (1994), a fink is some phenomenon that would alter an object’s disposition if that 
disposition’s stimulus conditions came about. Lewis’s (1997) example describes a wizard who is 
especially fond of a particular glass. Though the glass is fragile—disposed to break when 
struck—the wizard keeps watch over it and, if anything were to strike the glass, he would cast a 
spell that would cause the glass to cease to be fragile. That the glass ceases to be fragile when the 
wizard casts the spell does not mean that the glass was not fragile at earlier moments, insofar as 
it possessed a particular intrinsic property in virtue of its molecular structure. The glass’ 
disposition to break when struck is thus finkish, but until the stimulus conditions come about, the 
glass remains fragile. As Vihvelin puts it, “to be at risk of losing our abilities is not the same 
thing as actually losing our abilities” (2004: 448; Vihvelin’s emphasis). 
Lewis developed an analysis of dispositions intended to circumvent the problem posed by 
finks by specifying that an entity must retain the intrinsic property (some fact about the internal 
structure of the entity) in virtue of which it has a disposition in order to act in the manner that it 
is so disposed: 
Something x is disposed at time t to give response r to stimulus s iff, for some intrinsic 
property B that x has at t, for some time t′ after t, if x were to undergo stimulus s at time t 
and retain property B until t′, s and x’s having of B would jointly be an x-complete cause 
of x’s giving response r (Lewis 1997: 157). 
The wizard’s favorite glass is disposed at time t to break upon being dropped iff, for the 




and retained its molecular structure until t′, the glass’ being dropped and the glass’ molecular 
structure would together cause the glass to break. Because the wizard intervenes, the glass does 
not retain the molecular structure in virtue of which it had previously been fragile. But if the 
wizard had not intervened, the glass would have broken when struck. Lewis’s analysis would 
correctly yield the conclusion that the glass is fragile at the time before the spell is cast. 
 While Lewis’s analysis does well to solve the problem presented by finks, he was unable 
to account for a similar issue: the problems presented by masks. David Manley and Ryan 
Wasserman (2008) offer a simplified account of dispositions, which they argue avoids that 
problem. Masks are entities or forces that bear some relation to an object such that the object 
would not exercise its disposition if it were to be exposed to its stimulus conditions despite 
retaining the intrinsic property in virtue of which the object is so disposed. A fragile glass, for 
instance, can have its fragility masked by being placed in a layer of protective bubble wrap 
(Johnston 1992). While the glass is still fragile—its intrinsic properties are such that under 
normal conditions, it would break when struck—its present circumstances are not conducive to 
the glass’ disposition being exercised.  
 Such cases seem to provide counterexamples to Lewis’s conditional analysis of 
dispositions. Suppose that the glass in question were dropped while wrapped in bubble wrap. For 
the time period in question, it would retain the intrinsic property in virtue of which it is otherwise 
disposed to break when dropped—in this case, its molecular structure—but its having that 
property and being exposed to the stimulus that would otherwise cause it to break would, in this 
case, not cause it to break.  
Lewis attempts to skirt this objection through means of what Manley and Wasserman call 




not simply disposed-to-break-when-dropped, but is instead disposed-to-break-when-dropped- 
while-not-wrapped-in-bubble-wrap. For Lewis, solving the problem that masks present is simply 
a matter of making sure that we correctly identify the specific disposition in question and the 
specific stimulus conditions for that disposition to manifest. 
Manley and Wasserman argue against this strategy. There are infinitely many possible 
masks for any given disposition, so no finite specifications of conditions can ensure that there are 
no masks present (2008: 64). They also note that we cannot simply appeal to ideal conditions, as 
Mumford (1998) suggests we do, because this would result in a tautology: all objects are 
disposed to break under conditions under which they would break (Manley and Wasserman 
2008: 65). Manley and Wasserman advocate an understanding of dispositions according to which 
dispositions are ‘gradable,’ meaning that one object can have more or less of a particular 
disposition than another. A glass is disposed to break when dropped even if it does not break on 
any given drop; a glass that breaks on only 80% of drops would still be considered fragile. Some 
glasses are more fragile than others, but a glass that breaks on 95% of drops and a glass that 
breaks on 60% of drops are both fragile. Two glasses that differ in fragility differ in degree of 
their common disposition, not in kind, a fact that Lewis’s strategy does not capture. In light of 
this problem, Manley and Wasserman propose the following analysis, which they call PROP: 
 N is disposed to M in C if and only if N would M in some suitable proportion of C-cases  
(Manley and Wasserman 2008: 76). 
Their analysis is plausible and offers a degree of simplicity that Lewis’s does not, but it 








2.1 Vihvelin’s account of dispositions 
Vihvelin builds on the work of earlier dispositional analyses, focusing on the ability to make 
choices. She offers the following analysis, which she calls LCA-PROP-ABILITY, a nod to 
Lewis’s (1997) account and to Manley and Wasserman’s (2008) account: 
S has the narrow ability at time t to do R as the result of trying iff, for some intrinsic 
property B that S has at t, and for some time t′ after t, if S had the opportunity at t to do R 
and S tried to do R while retaining property B until time t′, then in a suitable proportion 
of these cases, S’s trying to do R and S’s having of B would be an S-complete cause of S’s 
doing R (Vihvelin 2013: 187; Vihvelin’s emphasis). 
Consider how this would apply to a baseball player’s ability to hit a home run. The best baseball 
players are able to hit home runs in less than a tenth of their attempts (or ‘at bats’). A baseball 
player is thus able to hit a home run at time t as the result of trying iff, for the properties that he 
has at t, and for some time t′ after t, if he had the opportunity to hit a home run and tried to hit a 
home run while retaining his intrinsic properties, then in a suitable proportion of cases, his trying 
to hit a home run and his having a particular set of intrinsic properties would jointly cause him to 
hit a home run. Even if a player failed to hit a home run in one given at bat, he might still be able 
to hit a home run. 
Possession of the ability to choose, which is a bundle of dispositions, is not sufficient for 
free will. Instead, agents must also be in a position to successfully exercise the ability. Central to 
Vihvelin’s account is the distinction between “narrow” and “wide” abilities (Vihvelin 2013: 11). 
Narrow abilities are those which an agent has in virtue of her intrinsic properties; wide abilities 
are those which an agent has in virtue of her intrinsic properties and her surroundings. Whether 




including her rational capacities. Whether an agent has the wide ability to choose depends on her 
narrow abilities in conjunction with her surroundings. 
Vihvelin’s analysis accounts for the fact that dispositions are gradable. As long as one 
succeeds at A-ing in a suitable proportion of cases, one is able to A. For different abilities, the 
threshold for possession of the ability might be higher or lower. Baseball players who are only 
able to hit a home run in every twentieth or thirtieth at bat are still able to hit home runs. Without 
accounting for gradability, we would have to conclude that for any given at bat during which a 
player does not hit a home run, the player was unable to do so, a concession that would 
undermine a dispositional analysis of abilities. Because hitting a home run is so difficult, the 
number of cases in which one must succeed in order to have the ability is relatively low. Note 
that the player’s ability differs in degree between game conditions and other, friendlier 
conditions such as batting practice, in which they might be expected to do so more frequently. 
We can thus distinguish between the ability-to-hit-home-runs-in-games and the ability-to-hit-
home-runs-in-batting-practice.2 
In her response to Harry Frankfurt’s (1969) attack on the ‘Principle of Alternative 
Possibilities,’ Vihvelin (2004, 2013) discusses how a dispositional analysis of free will relates to 
finkish dispositions.3 Frankfurt describes Jones, an agent who is shadowed by a neuroscientist, 
Black, while Jones decides whether to kill White. If Jones decides not to kill White, Black will 
intervene by means of a device that he has planted in Jones’s brain, causing him to kill White. As 
 
2 Whittle (2010) makes use of these more specific abilities in her argument against 
dispositional compatibilism. Whittle calls context-specific abilities ‘local abilities’ and the more 
broad abilities ‘global abilities.’ See note 10 for further discussion of Whittle’s argument. 
3 Smith (2003) and Fara (2005, 2008) offer responses to Frankfurt that resemble 
Vihvelin’s. See section II of this paper for a further discussion of Fara’s account of masks. See 




it happens, Jones chooses of his own accord to kill White, so Black never intervenes. Frankfurt 
concludes that one can be morally responsible for their actions even if one could not have done 
otherwise. Black, the would-be intervener, never actually intervenes with Jones’s abilities. 
Because he never actually intervenes, he merely threatens to remove Jones’s ability to choose 
(and to do) otherwise. Jones’s disposition to choose is finkish in the same way that the wizard’s 
glass is finkishly disposed to break when struck. Because the glass is never struck, the wizard 
never removes the glass’ disposition to break when struck. Because Jones does not decide 
against killing White, Black never removes Jones’s ability to choose (and to do) otherwise.  
Vihvelin’s response to Frankfurt highlights the approach that she takes towards finkish 
dispositions. Her response to masks is similar; when some environmental factor prevents an 
agent’s ability from being exercised in a suitable proportion of cases, the agent lacks the wide 
ability. Related to masks are mimics, which are cases in which an object without a disposition 
acts in the way that it would if it did have that disposition. Manley and Wasserman (2008) cite 
the example of a brick that is not fragile except in cases in which it is dropped on one particular 
point on its surface. While the brick is not likely to break when dropped, it will break when 
dropped on that particular spot. Similarly, I am not able to speak Russian because I am not 
disposed to speak Russian as a result of my trying to do so. I have heard enough Russian in 
movies to know roughly what Russian sounds like, though, so there is a slim chance that if I 
were to babble some Russian-sounding syllables, I would say something intelligible in Russian. 
But my saying so would merely mimic a Russian speaker’s genuine ability. 
I will assume for the remainder of this thesis that Vihvelin’s account of agential abilities 
is correct. By understanding abilities as gradable, impermanent, and susceptible to finks and to 




to choose on the basis of reasons are analogous to agents who are not manipulated but are only 
causally determined. 
 
2.2 Vihvelin’s response to manipulation arguments 
Before I propose my response to manipulation arguments such as Pereboom’s (2001), it 
should be noted that Vihvelin, too, has argued that manipulation arguments fail to undermine 
compatibilist accounts of free will. On Vihvelin’s account, to have free will is to have the wide 
ability to choose on the basis of reasons. In her response to Pereboom’s manipulation argument 
(2013: 148-155), Vihvelin questions whether the details of the cases are such that what holds of 
the first case (in which the neuroscientists actively intervene) also holds of the fourth (in which 
the agent is not manipulated but is merely causally determined). Vihvelin argues that because 
Plum1’s mental states are not properly caused, he cannot make rational choices. There is thus a 
difference relevant to moral responsibility between the first case and the fourth case, in which 
Plum4 suffers no outside influence (2013: 152). Vihvelin can thus reject Pereboom’s second 
premise, which states that there is no difference between any of the cases. Similar differences 
exist on some readings of Pereboom’s second and third cases. If the neuroscientists have 
designed Plum2 at birth such that he is incapable of learning, then he is not a normal agent with 
the ability to choose based on reasons. As such, there is a difference relevant to moral 
responsibility between Plum2 and Plum4. If Plum3, who was raised to be egoistic, is unable to 
change his character in the manner in which we assume rational adults are capable of changing, 
then he too lacks rational agency. Again, there is a difference between Plum3 and Plum4. 
Assuming that any of these details, which establish a difference relevant to moral responsibility 




line response (as opposed to a hard-line response, which would entail arguing that Plum1 is 
morally responsible for his actions) would succeed. But Vihvelin’s objections hinge on specific 
readings of the details of the three cases, leaving open the charge that her response is ad hoc. 
Though Pereboom has not responded to Vihvelin directly, he could argue that the details on the 
basis of which Vihvelin rejects his argument are only accidental. Further, Vihvelin’s response 
resembles other objections4 to Pereboom. Because Pereboom has addressed those objections, her 
response requires further development. 
 Whereas Vihvelin’s response relies on stipulating that Plum lacks relevant abilities 
altogether in Pereboom’s early cases, I will argue that a dispositional response to the 
manipulation argument requires a closer examination of masks. Without a theoretical basis for 
what counts as a mask, one might argue that Vihvelin does not do enough to distinguish cases in 
which an agent is manipulated and causally determined to act in one particular way from those in 
which an agent merely fails to exercise her ability, or chooses not to do so. More broadly, an 
account of masks is necessary for any adequate dispositional account of free will. In order to 
determine whether an agent who did not exercise one of her abilities could have exercised that 






4 For instance, Demetriou (2010) argues for a soft-line response on the grounds that 
Plum1’s mental states at the time at which he chooses to kill White are not caused by his earlier 
mental states. Pereboom responds to her in his (2014) iteration of the manipulation argument. I 






I will argue that manipulation arguments hinge on comparing agents whose abilities are 
masked5 to agents whose abilities are not. A principled account of masked dispositions will 
allow us to understand why it is intervention by neuroscientists and not determinism that 
precludes Plum1 from being a morally responsible agent. Put simply, intervention by 
neuroscientists masks Plum1’s rational abilities while determinism does not.  
Moral responsibility is tied closely to the presence of masks. An agent whose abilities are 
masked ought to be considered similar to an agent who lacks the abilities in question. Just as it 
would be inappropriate to hold an agent who does not know how to swim responsible for failing 
to save a drowning child, it would be inappropriate to hold an agent whose ability to swim is 
masked responsible for failing to save the child.6 Similarly, masks on one’s rational abilities can 
render an individual not morally responsible for their actions. Consider the legal defense that an 
individual is not guilty by reason of insanity; the assumption underlying the practice relies on the 
notion that the individual could not have done otherwise, given their mental health at the time of 
the crime, and that they should thus not be held responsible for their action. In some cases, this 
 
5 Narrow abilities pertain solely to the intrinsic properties of agents. Narrow abilities in 
themselves bear no relationship to properties of the world around an agent, or to other properties 
of that agent. Narrow abilities can thus only be altered or removed, and cannot be masked. 
References to masked abilities should be understood exclusively as references to wide abilities. 
6 This requires the assumption that the agent had no choice in the presence of the mask. A 
discussion of this possibility would require a thorough discussion of tracing and is thus beyond 
the scope of this thesis. An agent who chooses to drink without taking the proper precautions to 
ensure that they will not drive intuitively seems to be responsible for any damage that they cause 
while drunk driving. I would hold that their responsibility can be traced to the earlier decision 
that they made. They are unable to choose rationally at the time of their crash, but they could 





might be the result of temporary insanity that would count as a mask; in other cases, an agent 
might be entirely unable to make rational decisions. 
Because manipulated agents’ abilities are masked, and because causally determined 
agents’ abilities are not, there is a difference relevant to moral responsibility between 
Pereboom’s (2001) first case, in which Plum1 is actively controlled by neuroscientists, and his 
fourth case, in which Plum4 is causally determined. But because advocates of manipulation 
arguments would deny that their cases are meant to depict agents whose abilities are masked, a 
further examination of what counts as a mask is necessary to develop this response. In this 
section, I will discuss features of masks that make them relevant to manipulation arguments and 
propose an analysis of masks that succeeds where Fara’s (2008) analysis fails. 
As noted above, Vihvelin’s analysis focuses on the gradability of abilities and 
dispositions. Cases of masks must be distinguished from cases in which an object’s disposition 
fails to manifest due to chance alone and from cases in which an object’s disposition fails to 
manifest due to its lacking a narrow ability. Cases of masking are those in which an object’s 
disposition fails to manifest because the circumstances in which it was exposed to the stimulus 
that would normally cause to its disposition to manifest (at least in a suitable proportion of cases) 
include some feature that prevents the disposition from manifesting as it otherwise would. A 
glass that falls off a table and merely happens not to break differs from a glass wrapped in bubble 
wrap that falls off a table of the same height. On Vihvelin’s account of dispositions, the former 
could have broken under the exact same conditions; the latter could not have (or was far less 
likely to do so) because its disposition to break when dropped was masked by the bubble wrap.  
Bundles of dispositions can also be masked. Consider the abilities that properly 




circumstances conducive to driving (on a highway and not an ice sheet, for instance) has the 
ability to slow down and stop when its brake pedal is pressed. If someone placed an object 
beneath the car’s brake pedal, however, its ability would be masked. The object might be large 
enough that the brake pedal could not be pressed down at all, or small enough that it could only 
be pressed down slightly. The fact that objects of different sizes can mask the ability to different 
degrees demonstrates that masks can be graded much in the same way that abilities can. Suppose 
that the car in question were driving at sixty miles per hour down the highway. A car with no 
object under its brake pedal would be able to stop in less time than a car with such an object. 
How quickly a car with an object under its brake pedal would be able to stop depends on the size 
of the object. A car with a relatively small object beneath its brake pedal retains the ability to 
stop, but its ability is masked to a slight degree. A car with a relatively large object beneath its 
brake pedal also retains the ability to stop, but its ability is masked to a greater degree than that 
of the car with the small object beneath its pedal. A car with as large an object as can fit might 
have its ability to stop masked entirely. The same holds of a glass’ disposition to break when 
dropped; the more bubble wrap surrounding the glass, the higher the degree to which its 
disposition to break when dropped is masked. 
What holds here of objects’ bundles of dispositions also holds of agents’ abilities. Recall 
that we might distinguish between a baseball player’s ability-to-hit-home-runs-in-batting- 
practice and his ability-to-hit-home-runs-in-games. Both abilities can be masked. What counts as 
a mask for the former might not count as a mask for the latter. The possibility of a curveball 
being thrown is a part of the stimulus conditions for the latter, but not typically for the former, 




A bright flash of light that distracted the player would count as a mask on either, as it would 
decrease his ability in both cases. 
An analysis of masks must account for the gradability of both kinds of masks. Michael 
Fara (2008) has proposed the following analysis of masks: 
An agent’s ability to A in circumstances C is masked iff: 
1. The agent tries to A; 
2. circumstances C obtain; 
3. the agent retains the ability to A while trying to A; yet 
4. the agent does not succeed in Aing (Fara 2008: 848). 
I understand Fara’s use of “circumstances C” to mirror Vihvelin’s use of “opportunity.” As it 
stands, Fara’s analysis is over-inclusive in some respects and under-inclusive in others. First, 
Fara’s analysis fails to account for the fact that abilities are gradable and thus counts some things 
that are not masks as masks. Consider a case in which a baseball player swings at a pitch and 
misses. In such a case, each condition of Fara’s analysis would be satisfied; the player tried to hit 
a home run in the circumstances in which he is able to hit a home run, he retains his ability to hit 
home runs, and he fails to hit a home run. His ability to hit a home run would thus be considered 
masked, which, on a dispositional account of abilities, is clearly incorrect. Similarly, I am able to 
win the lottery in that when I buy a ticket, there is a chance that I can win. On Fara’s analysis, 
any case in which I buy a losing ticket will yield the conclusion that my ability to win was 
masked, which, again, is clearly incorrect. 
 Second, Fara’s analysis fails to account for the fact that an ability might still be masked 
even if the agent does not attempt to exercise it, and thus excludes some cases of masks. 
Consider, for instance, the following case, drawn from Ann Whittle (2010): 
Bound Ben: Ben, an excellent swimmer, has been forcibly bound to a chair. He watches 




Because Ben realizes that he cannot exercise his ability to swim, given his circumstances, he 
does not try to swim. As such, his ability to swim (and thus his ability to save the drowning 
child) would not count as masked on Fara’s analysis. But if he were to try, he would fail, which 
explains why he is not morally responsible for failing to save the child. In a case of a masked 
simple disposition, similarly, such as a glass wrapped in bubble wrap, we need not try to break 
the glass by dropping it to recognize that the glass’ disposition to break when dropped is masked. 
Third, Fara’s analysis fails to account for cases in which a disposition is exercised despite 
being masked. Suppose that a glass wrapped in bubble wrap were dropped and chipped slightly. 
The glass still broke when it was dropped, but it broke to a lesser degree than it would have if it 
were not wrapped in bubble wrap. Even though the glass’ fragility was masked, it would not 
count as masked on Fara’s analysis because its disposition was still exercised. An analysis of 
masks must make use of counterfactual conditionals, in the same way that a conditional analysis 
of dispositions does, in order to account for cases such as Bound Ben and the glass that only 
chips when dropped. To say that a disposition was masked depends on the actual sequence of 
events, as Fara does, is not sufficient. The intuition underlying the claim that dispositions could 
have been exercised even if they were not supports the same approach towards masks.  
To account for these problems, I propose the following analysis of masks on agential 
abilities: 
Some entity M masks an agent’s ability to A in circumstances C at time t until some later 
time t′ iff: 
1. The agent retains the narrow ability to A until t′; 
2. Circumstances C obtain at t; 
3. If the stimulus conditions were satisfied at t, the agent would A in a lower proportion of 
cases or to a lesser degree than they would if M were not present; 
4. M plays a causal role in (3). 




Some entity M masks an object’s disposition to A in circumstances C at time t until some 
later time t′ iff: 
1. The object retains the disposition to A until t′; 
2. Circumstances C obtain at t; 
3. If the manifestation conditions were satisfied at t, the object would A in a lower 
proportion of cases or to a lesser degree than it would if M were not present; 
4. M plays a causal role in (3). 
The satisfaction of (1) and (2) depends on the context of the attribution of the ability. To return 
to the example of the baseball player, I take it as a default assumption that curveballs might be 
thrown during games, but not that they might be thrown during batting practice. The possibility 
of a curveball thus ought to be counted as part of the stimulus conditions for a player’s ability-to-
hit-home-runs-during-games, but not for a player’s ability-to-hit-home-runs- during-batting-
practice.7 If a player were thrown a curveball during a game and were to miss it, we could 
choose to consider the even more specific ability-to-hit-home-runs-on-curveballs- during-games. 
There are contexts in which it will be more appropriate to examine this ability (say, when an 
opposing pitcher is considering how to approach an upcoming game) and contexts in which it is 
more appropriate to examine the broader ability-to-hit-home-runs-in-games.  
 The relevant circumstances should be understood in as minimal a sense as possible. In the 
case of the golfer, going any further than specifying that he has a club, a golf ball, and a hole 
would require that we adopt the strategy of getting specific, which will ultimately undermine the 
dispositional analysis of abilities. Though there might be cases in which the particular 
circumstances require that we look at a more specific disposition, a usual circumstance would 
not. Saying that a golfer’s ability was masked by the presence of the wind is helpful if we are 
trying to determine whether the golfer will make his next shot. If there is little chance of wind 
 
7 If a pitcher does not normally throw a curveball, it might be reasonable to say that the 
possibility of his throwing a curveball is not part of the manifestation conditions, in which case it 
would be reasonable to say that the pitcher throwing a curveball would mask the batter’s ability 




picking up again when he prepares for his next putt, then whether he is able-to-putt-successfully- 
when-the-wind-picks-up is less helpful than whether he is able-to-putt-successfully. Because the 
latter is more helpful, we should understand the wind as a mask instead of as part of the stimulus 
conditions of the disposition. 
More must be said about what counts as a test case for a mask. Consider first how we 
might determine the relevant test cases for a disposition. A glass is fragile if it is such that it will 
break in a sufficient proportion of cases in which it is dropped on hard surfaces. Suppose that a 
given glass does not break on one particular drop. Such a case would count as an individual test 
case, but more test cases are required to determine the degree to which the glass is (or was) 
fragile. We must examine the same drop in a number of nearby possible worlds, changing as few 
details as possible about the stimulus conditions and the intrinsic property in virtue of which the 
object has the disposition.8 If we were to change anything about the constitution of the glass, we 
would change its dispositions, and would thus no longer be testing the same disposition. By 
changing minor details about the air currents around the glass, the force with which the glass is 
knocked off of the table, and similarly relevant details, or by making slight alterations to the laws 
of nature, we can generate new test cases in appropriately nearby possible worlds.9 By 
considering the proportion of such cases in which the glass breaks, we can determine whether the 
glass is fragile and how fragile it is. Which facts and laws of nature are appropriate to change 
 
8 We can, of course, continue to test the glass by dropping it in the actual world. It is 
important to note, however, that in the event that the glass should break the first time it is 
dropped, further tests in the actual world would be impossible. Further, there are instances of 
cases in which further tests in the actual world might be impossible; a presidential candidate can 
only run in a given election once. 
9  See Lewis (1981) for a discussion of divergence miracles, which can be stipulated to 





depends on the context of the attribution; to paraphrase Lewis (1986: 21), discussing worlds in 
which glasses float when dropped will not help if we are concerned with a glass’ disposition to 
break when dropped in the actual world. 
 To test whether a disposition is masked, we should take the same approach. The relevant 
stimulus conditions, the intrinsic facts that constitute the relevant dispositions, and the mask 
itself should all be held fixed. By considering the proportions of such cases in which the mask is 
held fixed and the disposition is not exercised, we can determine whether the object’s disposition 
is masked and the degree to which it is. 
Consider how my analysis applies to paradigmatic cases of masks: 
Bubble wrap masks a glass’ disposition to break when dropped at time t iff: 
1. The glass retains its disposition to break when dropped until t′. 
2. The circumstances in which the glass is disposed to break when dropped obtain. 
3. If the glass were dropped at t, it would break in a lower proportion of cases than it would 
if it were not wrapped in bubble wrap. 
4. Bubble wrap plays a causal role in the glass’ not breaking when dropped. 
Suppose that a particular glass, when not wrapped in bubble wrap, broke in half of the relevant 
test cases. When wrapped in a full layer bubble wrap, suppose that it broke in just one tenth of 
the relevant test cases. The full layer of bubble wrap would mask the glass’ fragility to a greater 
degree than would a small piece of bubble wrap taped to one side of the glass. While the small 
piece might prevent the glass from breaking in one in each thousand cases, and would thus count 
as a mask, it masks the glass’ fragility to a far lesser degree than does the full layer of bubble 
wrap. Consider how my analysis would apply to agential abilities such as Austin’s (1956) golfer: 
 The wind picking up masks the golfer’s ability to putt successfully at t iff: 
1. The golfer retains the narrow ability to putt successfully until a later time t′. 
2. The circumstances in which the golfer is able to putt successfully obtain at t (i.e. the 
golfer is awake, has a golf club and a ball, and is on a golf course). 
3. If the golfer were to try to putt at t, he would miss his putt in a higher proportion of cases 
than he would if the wind did not pick up after he putted. 




Again, each condition is satisfied, and the golfer’s ability to putt successfully counts as masked 
on my analysis. A stronger gust of wind will mask the golfer’s ability to a greater degree than a 
weaker gust of wind, as a stronger gust will make the golfer miss by a greater margin.  
As I have argued, Fara’s analysis is unable to account for specific cases: those in which 
an agent fails to do something because her ability is gradable, those in which an agent does not 
try to exercise her ability, and those in which an agent succeeds at something to a lesser degree 
than she would if the mask were not present. I believe that my analysis addresses each of these 
problems. First, it is unclear what would count as the mask in a case in which, for instance, I 
failed to win the lottery because I picked out the wrong ticket. Holding fixed all of the facts 
about my decision-making process in buying a ticket, there are nearby possible worlds in which 
any ticket that I bought would be the winner. Should we hold that my buying a ticket with the 
losing number on it counts as a mask, the conclusion that my ability to win the lottery is masked 
by my buying a losing ticket would be trivial. Should we hold that my buying a ticket with that 
particular number on it masks my ability to win the lottery, (3) would be false, because there is 
no reason to suppose that my particular number is any less likely to win than any other number. 
Such a case would thus not count as an instance of a mask; instead, I failed to win the lottery 
because my ability to win is incredibly unlikely to be exercised successfully. Cases in which 
agents fail to successfully exercise an ability because they have the ability to a low degree thus 
do not count as masks on my analysis. 
 Second, consider the difference between how my analysis would address a case like 
Whittle’s ‘Bound Ben’ (2010) and how Fara’s analysis would. Because Ben does not try to 




ability is masked, because condition (3) builds in a conditional that accounts for cases in which 
agents do not try to exercise their abilities: 
 The ropes tied around Ben mask his ability to save the drowning child at t iff: 
2. Ben retains the narrow ability to save the child until t′; 
3. The circumstances in which Ben is normally able to exercise his ability obtain (i.e. he is 
awake and he is near a body of water); 
4. If Ben tried to exercise his ability at t, he would succeed in a lower proportion of cases 
than he would if he were not bound; 
5. The ropes play a causal role in Ben’s failure to save the drowning child. 
Each condition is true, and Ben’s ability thus counts as masked on my analysis. Finally, consider 
the difference between Fara’s analysis and mine in whether a car with a small object beneath its 
brake pedal would count as having an ability masked: 
 The object beneath the brake pedal masks the car’s ability to stop at t iff: 
1. The car retains the narrow ability to stop until t′; 
2. The circumstances in which the car is normally able to stop obtain (i.e. the car is driving 
on a road); 
3. If the brake pedal were pressed at t, the car would slow down at a slower rate than it 
would if the object beneath its brake pedal were not present; 
4. The object beneath the brake pedal plays a causal role in the car’s decreased ability to 
stop. 
Unlike Fara’s analysis, mine accounts for the fact that the car’s ability to stop is masked in this 
case. Further, as argued above, this analysis accounts for the fact that masks are gradable. The 
larger the rock placed under the car’s pedal, the more its ability to stop will be masked. 
Drunkenness masks someone’s ability to drive; the more one drinks, the more one’s ability to 
drive is masked.  
We thus have criteria for what should and should not count as a mask on a manipulated 
agent’s ability. On a dispositional account of free will, status as a morally responsible agent 
depends on the absence of masks on the relevant abilities. One of the chief advantages of 
understanding masks as coming in degrees is that such an understanding allows for moral 




choose is masked to a slight degree and their moral responsibility is similarly only slightly 
decreased. In the following section, I will argue that this analysis, when applied to Pereboom’s 
earlier (2001) set of manipulation cases, yields the conclusion that Plum1’s rational abilities are 
masked and that Plum4’s are not, providing a principled reason to reject Pereboom’s claim that 





4 PEREBOOM’S MANIPULATION CASES 
I have offered a new analysis of masks on simple dispositions and agential abilities. With 
this analysis in mind, we can examine Pereboom’s claim that Plum1, who is actively 
manipulated by neuroscientists, is not morally responsible in virtue of the fact that his actions are 
causally determined. What holds across each iteration of Pereboom’s manipulation argument is 
that the agent in the final case is a normal, unimpeded agent in a deterministic universe who 
chooses of his own accord to kill White. Such agents are not subject to masks. The mere fact that 
a universe is deterministic does not preclude the agent from making a different decision in 
nearby possible worlds. Consider my analysis applied to determinism: 
A set of deterministic laws of nature masks an agent’s ability to choose on the basis of 
reasons at time t iff: 
1. The agent retains the narrow ability to choose on the basis of reasons until some later 
time t1; 
2. The circumstances in which the agent is normally able to exercise their ability obtain at t 
(i.e. they are awake and aware of the relevant reasons); 
3. If the agent tried to exercise their ability at t, they would succeed in a lower proportion of 
cases than they would if the laws of nature were not deterministic; 
4. The laws’ being deterministic play a causal role in the agent’s failure to choose on the 
basis of reasons. 
Assuming a dispositional account of free will, there is no reason to believe that (3) is true. As 
Vihvelin (2013) puts it, determinism does not matter for free will. Just as a glass that falls off a 
table in a deterministic universe and happens not to break could have broken, an agent in a 
deterministic universe who decides to act in one way could have decided to act differently. 
Determinism no more masks agential abilities than it masks simple dispositions such as fragility. 
There is no reason to believe that a set of universes with indeterministic laws of nature would 
produce a higher proportion of cases in which an agent succeeds at choosing to act differently 
than a set of universes with deterministic laws of nature would produce. One might object that 




we hold fixed the particular set of deterministic laws of nature and the past state of the universe. 
But if we were to do so, then it would not be determinism, but instead that particular set of laws 
of nature in conjunction with the past state of the universe that would be the mask, and not the 
mere fact that the laws of nature are deterministic. Determinism is not a mask. 
In different iterations of Pereboom’s argument, the first, second, and third Plums are 
subject to different forms of manipulation, and thus possess varying degrees of the ability to 
choose, understood in terms of dispositions and masks. Since first developing the argument 
(Pereboom 1995; 2001), Pereboom has altered his cases in light of arguably ad hoc responses to 
specific readings of what he would consider unimportant details. As he does in more recent 
iterations of the argument (Pereboom 2013; 2014), he can specify that there is a proper causal 
relationship between Plum1’s earlier and later mental states, thus addressing Vihvelin’s objection 
to his first case. Though he has not done so explicitly, Pereboom could also specify that Plum2 is 
able to learn and that Plum3 is able to change his character, addressing Vihvelin’s responses to 
his second and third cases.  
While Vihvelin’s response to Pereboom suffices for those particular readings of those 
cases, a dispositional response should focus on whether each agent’s rational abilities are 
masked. As I will argue below, some of Pereboom’s first cases depict agents whose rational 
abilities are masked, and who thus do not retain their abilities to choose on the basis of reasons 
throughout the case. On some readings of his more recent cases, the agents’ abilities are left 
unmasked, meaning that each retains the ability to choose on the basis of reasons during the 
relevant time period. For each case, if Plum’s rational abilities are masked, then he is not morally 
responsible for his actions (or is at least less morally responsible, depending on the degree to 




responsibility between Plum and a causally determined agent whose abilities are not masked. 
Regarding any such cases, we should take a soft-line response. If Plum’s abilities are left 
unaffected, then he never loses his rational abilities and remains an appropriate target of moral 
responsibility. Regarding those cases, we should take a hard-line response. 
If Plum’s ability to choose on the basis of reasons is masked, the considerations relevant 
to whether he is morally responsible will be the same as those for any other agent whose ability 
is masked. As I argue above, a person tied to a chair is not responsible for failing to save a 
drowning person; being tied to a chair masks their ability to do so. Their circumstances prevent 
them from acting as would be necessary to save the drowning person.10 In light of this response, 
consider Pereboom’s (2001) first case: 
Professor Plum was created by neuroscientists, who…“locally” manipulate him to 
undertake the process of reasoning by which his desires are brought about and modified – 
directly producing his every state from moment to moment. The neuroscientists 
manipulate him by...pushing a series of buttons just before he begins to reason about his 
situation, thereby causing his reasoning process to be rationally egoistic. Plum...does not 
act because of an irresistible desire...and he does not think and act contrary to character 
since he is often manipulated to be rationally egoistic. His effective first-order desire to 
kill Ms. White conforms to his second-order desires. Plum’s reasoning process 
exemplifies the various components of moderate reasons-responsiveness. He is receptive 
to the relevant pattern of reasons, and his reasoning process would have resulted in 
different choices in some situations in which the egoistic reasons were otherwise. At the 
same time, he is not exclusively rationally egoistic since he will typically regulate his 
behavior by moral reasons when the egoistic reasons are relatively weak – weaker than 
they are in the current situation (2001: 112-113). 
 
10 This is controversial; see Whittle (2010) for further discussion. Whittle argues that the 
relevant abilities in Frankfurt-style cases are more specific than the general abilities that all 
agents have, and we should hold fixed the presence of the manifestation conditions when 
attributing someone an ability. Jones is not “disposed-to-do- otherwise-with-the-device-present” 
(2010: 9). Because he lacks the ability, Whittle argues, the dispositional approach to Frankfurt 
fails. Though her argument is beyond the scope of this paper, I would argue that her response 
mischaracterizes the dispositional response to Frankfurt. Jones is, per Vihvelin’s (2004) 
response, still disposed-to- do-otherwise-with-the-device-present until Black actually activates 





Pereboom’s argument relies on the claims that (i) Plum1 satisfies any and all proposed 
compatibilist conditions and that (ii) Plum1 is not morally responsible for his actions. If Plum1’s 
ability to make rational choices is masked by the neuroscientists intervention, then (i) is false. 
Consider how his ability fares on my analysis of masks: 
The neuroscientists’ intervention masks Plum1’s ability to make rational decisions at time t 
until some later time t1 iff: 
1. Plum1 retains the narrow ability to make rational decisions until t1; 
2. The circumstances in which Plum1 is normally able to make rational decisions obtain 
(i.e. Plum1 is awake and consciously aware of the world around him); 
3. If Plum1 tried to make a rational decision, he would do so in a far lower proportion of 
cases than he would if the neuroscientists did not intervene; 
4. The neuroscientists’ intervention plays a causal role in Plum1’s failure to make a rational 
decision. 
Each statement is true, so Plum1’s ability to make rational decisions is masked. Suppose that at 
some moment during the process of the neuroscientists’ intervention, Plum1 formed the intention 
to make a rational choice to refrain from killing White. Because the neuroscientists control each 
of his mental states on a moment-to-moment basis, the intention that Plum1 forms will not play a 
causal role in his later mental states. If he tried to make a rational decision, he would fail to do so 
in any test case in which the neuroscientists alter his mental states as Pereboom says they do. 
Further, because his ability to make rational decisions is masked, Pereboom’s claim that Plum1’s 
“reasoning process exemplifies the various components of moderate reasons-responsiveness” 
(2001: 111) is false.11 Because Plum1’s ability to make rational decisions is masked by the 
neuroscientists’ intervention, he is not “receptive to the relevant patterns of reasons” (2001: 111). 
The fact that Plum1 seems to engage in a reasoning process is irrelevant; the neuroscientists are 
the cause of each of his mental states, and they only mimic a reasoning process. 
 




Though a different set of reasons might have resulted in him acting differently, such 
cases are irrelevant in light of the fact that the neuroscientists intervene by implanting egoistic 
reasons in him. As I have argued, possible worlds in which the mask is not present should not be 
used as test cases in determining whether an agent’s abilities are actually masked, but instead 
should be used as a comparison against cases in which the mask is present. To say that Plum1 
would act differently if the reasons available to him were different is akin to saying that a glass 
wrapped in bubble wrap would have broken when dropped if it were not wrapped in bubble 
wrap. That the glass would have broken without the bubble wrap only further supports the 
conclusion that the glass’ disposition to break when dropped is masked, as it highlights the truth 
of (3). Similarly, in this case, the fact that Plum1 would have acted differently if the 
neuroscientists were not present and if he were exposed to different reasons only highlights that 
(3) is true.  
Plum1’s ability to choose on the basis of reasons is masked, so there is a relevant 
disanalogy between him and a causally determined agent whose rational abilities are not masked. 
As I have argued, causal determinism, unlike the kind of intervention that Pereboom describes, is 
not a mask. There is a clear difference between the first and fourth cases, so a soft-line response 
is appropriate here; the question becomes whether the line should be drawn between the first and 
second, second and third, or third and fourth cases. Consider Pereboom’s second case: 
Plum is like an ordinary human being, except that he was created by neuroscientists, who, 
although they cannot control him directly, have programmed him to weigh reasons for 
action so that he is often but not exclusively rationally egoistic, with the result that in the 
circumstances in which he now finds himself, he is causally determined to undertake the 
moderately reasons-responsive process and to possess the set of first- and second-order 
desires that results in his killing Ms.White. He has the general ability to regulate his 
behavior by moral reasons, but in these circumstances, the egoistic reasons are very 
powerful, and accordingly he is causally determined to kill for these reasons. 




Pereboom specifies that “although Plum satisfies each of the compatibilist conditions, intuitively 
he is not morally responsible” (2001: 114) and that: 
Causal determination by factors beyond Plum’s control most plausibly explains his lack 
of moral responsibility in the first case, and I think that we are forced to say that he is not 
morally responsible in the second case for the same reason (2001: 114).  
The better explanation for Plum1’s lack of moral responsibility is the fact that his relevant 
abilities are masked. Because Pereboom is wrong to conclude that Plum1 is not responsible as a 
result of his being causally determined by factors beyond his control, whether the argument 
generalizes from the first case to the second hinges on whether Plum2’s rational abilities are also 
masked, not on whether Plum2 is also causally determined. 
 Pereboom writes that “in the circumstances in which [Plum2] finds himself, he is causally 
determined to undertake the moderately reasons-responsive process” in virtue of which he 
decides to kill White (2001: 114). On a dispositional account of free will, the fact that he is 
causally determined to reason in a particular way does not entail that he lacks the ability to 
choose on the basis of reasons. In this case, Plum2 tries to choose on the basis of reasons and 
succeeds in doing so. Nothing about this case suggests that his doing so is an aberration; in a 
suitable proportion of cases, he will presumably successfully exercise his ability. His ability to 
choose on the basis of reasons is thus not masked, and there is a relevant disanalogy between 
Plum1 and Plum2. Because the mask on Plum1’s rational abilities is the best explanation for 
Plum1’s lack of moral responsibility, and because Plum2’s ability to choose is not masked, the 
disanalogy between them supports the soft-line approach I have outlined here. Plum2 is thus 
morally responsible for his actions. The fact that Plum1 and Plum2 are both causally determined 
to choose on the basis of reasons is irrelevant, as Plum1’s being causally determined is not the 
reason that he is not morally responsible. On this iteration of Pereboom’s manipulation 




 An advocate of the manipulation argument presented here might respond to the objection 
I have posed by noting that if any facts were different, the neuroscientists would have designed 
Plum2 differently so as to account for those facts. By the parameters of the thought experiment, 
there is no reason to believe that there are possible worlds in which there exist details that the 
neuroscientists did not take into account. As such, one might argue, if we were to change some 
minor detail in the environment in order to generate a new test case, we would also have to 
change the details about how the neuroscientists programmed Plum2. Such a response, however, 
would be an appeal to the finkish nature of Plum2’s rational abilities.  
 To respond to this objection, we can appeal to the same response that Vihvelin (2004) 
levels against Frankfurt’s cases. If Jones or his environment had been slightly different, Jones 
might have decided (or begun to decide) against killing White. If Jones had begun to decide 
against killing White, Black would have intervened so as to ensure that Jones would decide to 
kill White. But the fact that Black would have intervened does not mean that Jones actually loses 
his ability to do otherwise. In this case, the same holds true. If facts about Plum2’s environment 
had been different, then the way in which he had been altered would not cause him to kill White 
in every case. But to examine test cases, we would need to hold fixed Plum2’s psychological 
state. Though it might be true that the neuroscientists would have changed Plum2’s programming 
if things were different, Plum2 was able to choose to do otherwise at the time at which he chose 











5 PEREBOOM’S NEW CASES 
Pereboom’s goal is to present a manipulated agent no different regarding any compatibilist 
capacity from a causally determined agent—an agent who is reasons responsive, has second-
order desires that conform to his first-order desires, and has any other capacity that a 
compatibilist might say is necessary for free will (2014: 75). Because Vihvelin holds that the 
wide ability to choose on the basis of reasons is necessary for free will, and because retaining the 
ability requires that the ability is not masked, Pereboom could argue that his cases still prove his 
conclusion if the manipulation in the first case does not mask Plum1’s ability to choose while 
still rendering him not morally responsible. Pereboom argues that his most recent (2013, 2014) 
iterations address this challenge directly by addressing a common objection to his argument—
that Plum1 lacks agency altogether (2014: 76). 
Though Pereboom raises this objection in response to Demetriou (2010), it can also serve as 
an objection to the dispositional response I have proposed here. Demetriou argues that the kind 
of intervention that would be necessary for Plum1 to act as the neuroscientists desire regardless 
of his earlier mental states would preclude the possibility of his having the kind of control over 
his own actions that would be necessary for him to be an agent at all. While Pereboom can alter 
the case so as to reduce the neuroscientists’ control over Plum1, a diminished degree of control 
on the neuroscientists’ part over Plum1’s actions would suggest that Plum1 is responsible for his 




 Pereboom (2014) objects to Demetriou on the grounds that cases can be drawn up so as to 
avoid this problem. He presents the following revised first case: 
A team of neuroscientists has the ability to manipulate Plum’s neural states at any time 
by radio-like technology. In this particular case, they do so by pressing a button just 
before he begins to reason about his situation, which they know will produce in him a 
neural state that realizes a strongly egoistic reasoning process, which the neuroscientists 
know will deterministically result in his decision to kill White. Plum would not have 
killed White had the neuroscientists not intervened, since his reasoning would then not 
have been sufficiently egoistic to produce this decision. (2014: 76-77) 
As he does in his (2001) iteration of the argument, Pereboom argues that Plum1’s first-order 
desires conform to his second-order desires, and that he deliberates using his rational abilities. If 
Plum1’s reasoning process had been different, he would have refrained from killing White. 
Further, Plum1 is often but not always egoistic, so his decision is ultimately in line with his 
character. Because of the intervention, Pereboom holds that it would seem inappropriate to hold 
Plum1 morally responsible for killing White. Because the neuroscientists cause the realization of 
only one mental state, Plum1 still exercises his rational abilities, and it is in virtue of a decision 
that he makes that he chooses to kill White. If faced with my objections to his (2001) iteration of 
the manipulation argument, Pereboom could argue that this case does not depict an agent whose 
rational abilities are masked. Instead, it depicts an agent whose abilities are exercised differently 
than they would have been without intervention. But, he would argue, there is still reason to 
believe that Plum1 is not morally responsible, so the best explanation for his not being morally 
responsible must be that he is causally determined. 
Similarly, Pereboom argues that Seth Shabo’s (2010) manipulation case, the Ego Button, 
avoids Demetriou’s causal control dilemma. In it, a politician named Natasha deliberates about 
whether to release damaging information about an opponent. Neuroscientists who want the 
opponent eliminated cause a one-time shift in Natasha’s reasoning process such that she becomes 




By ramping up activity in one region of Natasha's brain while suppressing it in another, 
the Ego Button ensures that her reasoning about the situation will be structured around 
the question, ‘Which of my options will best further my interests?’ (2010: 376).  
Shabo specifies that Natasha’s “agential capacities are in no way impaired when she acts” (2010: 
377). Though he does not discuss the case in terms of masks, his comment suggests that he, like 
Pereboom, means to depict a case in which the manipulated agent’s abilities are not masked. 
Rather than the sort of moment-to-moment control that would suffice for a mask, Shabo seems 
to  present a one-time intervention. If the neuroscientists merely shift the focus of Natasha’s 
reasoning to a different question, Natasha seems to retain and exercise her rational abilities while 
making her decision. Shabo argues that any charge (such as Demetriou’s) that Natasha lacks 
agential abilities fails; she is clearly engaged in a reasoning process and has the sort of first-
person perspective that Plum1—whose mental states are controlled on a moment-to-moment 
basis—lacks (2010: 377). Natasha is not morally responsible, Shabo argues, yet, her abilities 
seem to be left unmasked.12 
 In both cases, the agents intuitively seem to be in full control of their mental states and 
their actions at the time at which they act. In both cases, the agents were manipulated in such a 
way that they intuitively seem not to be morally responsible for their actions. If Pereboom is 
right, then these cases manage to avoid my response to Pereboom’s (2001) case—and 
Demetriou’s causal control dilemma—because the agents are not morally responsible but their 
abilities to choose are not masked. 
 But recall that analyzing whether an agent’s ability is masked requires a temporal index, 
as does analyzing whether an agent has an ability. In both cases, we can choose whether to 
examine the time period from just before the neuroscientists intervene or from just before the 
 
12 Though Shabo does not put it in terms of masks and abilities, this is how his conclusion 




agent begins to deliberate about their action. Suppose the following time stamps for Pereboom’s 
(2014) first case: 
t1: The moment just before the neuroscientists press the button. 
t2: The moment at which Plum1 begins to reason. 
t3: The moment just after Plum1 kills White. 
Whether Plum1’s ability is masked depends on whether we examine the period from t1 to t3 or the 
period from t2 to t3. Consider first the time from t1 to t3:  
The neuroscientists’ intervention masks Plum1’s ability to make rational decisions at t1 
iff: 
1. Plum1 retains the ability to make rational decisions until t3; 
2. The circumstances in which Plum1 is normally able to make rational decisions obtain 
(i.e. Plum1 is awake and consciously aware of the world around him); 
3. If Plum1 tried to make a rational decision at t1, he would do so in a far lower proportion 
of cases than he would if the neuroscientists did not intervene; 
4. The neuroscientists’ intervention plays a causal role in Plum1’s failure to make a rational 
decision. 
If Plum1 tried to make a decision at t1, he would fail to do so. Given that the neuroscientists will 
intervene in the case, any decision that Plum1 makes or begins to make at t1 will lack causal 
efficacy on his actions later. While some of his mental states at t1 (his perceptions, his memories, 
and so on) will still play a role in his decision at a later time, he is unable at t1 to act in such a 
way that he will refrain from killing White. The neuroscientists’ intervention prevents him from 
being able to make a rational decision and from being able to do other than kill White. During 
this time period, Plum1’s ability is masked, and he is thus not responsible for killing White. 
 In examining his abilities from t2 to t3, however, we will reach a different conclusion. On 
that latter time-slice, no force or entity that would count as a mask exists, as the neuroscientists 
do not act on him in any way during that particular time period. Pereboom might object that the 
intervention counts as that force, but examining the time period from t2 to t3 commits us to 
ignoring the intervention; if we should only focus on the time after the intervention occurs, then, 




control of his abilities during this time period, he is only in full control because there is no mask 
present. Examining only that time period, on a dispositional account of free will, Plum1 is able to 
do otherwise. 
For the claim that Plum1’s abilities are not masked to be true, Pereboom must commit to 
examining only the time period after the intervention, and must ignore all facts about Plum1 
prior to the intervention. But it is only because of Plum1’s prior mental states that we believe that 
he would have decided differently if there were no intervention. It is because we index his later 
mental states to his earlier mental states that he seems not to be morally responsible for his 
actions. Including any fact about Plum1’s abilities prior to the intervention, which is necessary 
for Pereboom’s claim that he is not morally responsible, would force Pereboom to widen the 
time period during which we determine if he has the ability such that it would include that earlier 
time period. Doing so shows that Plum1’s rational abilities are masked. Should we choose, 
however, to assess Plum1’s abilities from t2 to t3, the criteria for a masked ability are left 
unsatisfied, and Plum1 can be held morally responsible for his actions. Like the golfer who 
missed his putt but could have made it, because no mask is present, on a dispositional analysis of 
abilities, Plum1 could have chosen to refrain from killing White. While Pereboom is right that 
there is no difference in regard to moral responsibility between Plum1 and a causally determined 
agent, he has sacrificed his theoretical basis for the intuition that Plum1 is not morally 
responsible. 
The same holds true of Shabo’s case. Determining whether Natasha is able to choose on 
the basis of reasons requires that we examine a particular time period. Because of the 
significance of the intervention here, examining different time periods will lead to different 




unmasked. Let t1 stand for a moment just before the neuroscientists press the Ego button, let t2 
stand for the moment at which Natasha begins to deliberate, and let t3 stand for the moment at 
which Natasha decides to release the information. From t2 until t3, Natasha is able to choose on 
the basis of reasons—her abilities are such that if she chooses to refrain from releasing the 
information, she will do so.  
Examining the cases in this way explains why our intuitions tell us that Plum1 and 
Natasha are not morally responsible but are in complete control of their decision-making 
processes at the time at which they act. Pereboom and Shabo draw on our intuitions from one 
temporal index to argue that they are not morally responsible, and from the other temporal index 
to argue that they are in control. But there is no theoretical reason to mix-and-match our 
intuitions about agency and responsibility; our intuitions about agency from each temporal index 
should go with our intuitions about responsibility from each temporal index. When we include 
the manipulation in the temporal index, Plum1 and Natasha are not responsible for their actions, 
but their rational abilities are masked. When we exclude the manipulation, their rational abilities 
are not masked, but the fact that we are screening off the manipulation from view means that 
there is no reason to hold that they are not morally responsible. There is no reason to match our 
intuitions about responsibility from the earlier index with our intuitions about agency from the 
later index; doing so would be similar to matching our responsibility intuitions from the later 
index to our agency intuitions from the earlier index. 
Note that I do not commit to examining one time period or the other in order to determine 
whether Plum1 and Natasha are morally responsible. This is a conditional response; if you 
believe that the only time period we should consider when assessing whether an agent is morally 




only after the intervention occurs, but in doing so, we relinquish any theoretical backing for the 
intuition that either is not morally responsible. If you believe that we should assess the entire 
period, there is theoretical backing for the intuition that either is not morally responsible, but 
their abilities are masked. Either approach is reasonable, but there is no plausible approach to 
moral responsibility on which an assessment will yield the conclusion that their abilities are not 
masked and that they are not morally responsible. My claim here is only that whichever time 
period ultimately proves to be the more appropriate one to assess for moral responsibility will 
render true one and only one of the two premises of the manipulation argument. If we examine 
Plum1/Natasha-from-t1-to-t3, we should take a soft-line response. If we examine Plum1/Natasha- 
from-t2-to-t3, we should take a hard-line response. While a hard-line response might seem 
unintuitive, it must be emphasized that examining the later time period requires that we ignore 
the manipulation entirely, as considering the manipulation at all implicitly commits us to 















6 THE ZYGOTE ARGUMENT 
Mele (2006) has developed a manipulation argument that he takes to overcome the 
fundamental problems with Pereboom’s argument. Diana, an all-powerful goddess in a 
deterministic universe, desires that some event should occur thirty years from now. She creates a 
zygote in Mary which will develop into a man, Ernie, who is causally determined to act in the 
way that Diana desires. Thirty years later, Ernie acts as Diana designed him to act. Despite the 
fact that he satisfies any and all compatibilist conditions for agency, he is not morally responsible 
for his actions. 
Mele compares Ernie to Bernie, another agent in a causally determined universe, who, 
like Ernie, is causally determined to commit some morally reprehensible act in the future. But 
Bernie’s zygote develops as a result of chance, not intentional design. Mele argues that there is 
no difference relevant to moral responsibility between Ernie and Bernie. His manipulation 
argument follows: 
1. Because of the way his zygote was produced in his deterministic universe, Ernie is not a 
free agent and is not morally responsible for anything. 
2. Concerning free action and the moral responsibility of the beings into whom the zygotes 
develop, there is no significant difference between the way Ernie’s zygote comes to exist 
and the way any normal human zygote comes to exist in a deterministic universe.  
3. So determinism precludes free action and moral responsibility (Mele 2006: 189). 
Say then that t1 is the moment before which Diana intervenes and creates the embryo, t2 is a 
moment before Ernie begins to deliberate about his action, and t3 is a moment just after he acts. 
Should we hold that the relevant time period is t1 to t3, then Diana’s intervention seems relevant 
to the question of whether Ernie is able to do otherwise and whether he is able to make rational 




irrelevant. In this regard, Mele’s case resembles Pereboom’s (2014) case and Shabo’s (2010) 
case. 
 But Diana’s intervention differs in two key ways from the kind of manipulation that 
Pereboom and Shabo describe. First, the intervention occurs much longer ago than the 
manipulation that Pereboom and Shabo describe. In this sense, the case is more similar to 
Pereboom’s second case, in which the neuroscientists program Plum2 at birth to be sufficiently 
egoistic as to be the kind of person who will kill White. Because Pereboom and Shabo both 
argue that there is no principled difference between manipulation thirty seconds, thirty minutes, 
or thirty years before an action occurs, this difference can be overlooked. 
 The second difference, however, is more significant. Pereboom and Shabo both describe 
manipulation of mental states. Even in Pereboom’s second case, the neuroscientists alter Plum2’s 
mental states when he is born. Mele, on the other hand, describes the creation of a zygote, not the 
alteration of mental states. As such, my discussion of masks seems irrelevant to Mele’s 
argument. Diana’s intervention does not seem sufficient to rob Ernie of his ability to choose on 
the basis of reasons, and thus does not seem to be a mask. On my account, this would entail that 
Ernie is able to choose and is morally responsible for his decision. 
 Determining whether an agent is able to do something requires that we look at a number 
of similar cases. We can no more determine from this one case alone that Ernie is unable to 
choose on the basis of reasons, understood as a bundle of dispositions, than we can conclude that 
a match could not have lit from a single failed strike, or that a golfer is unable to putt from a 
single miss. Call the world in which Ernie chooses to exercise his rational capacities and acts 
immorally w1. If we hold fixed every fact about Ernie in w1, then in a nearby possible world w2 in 




 Advocates of the zygote argument would likely respond by pointing out that if some fact 
or law were different, then Diana would have designed Ernie differently. While that is true, that 
does not mean that the Ernie in w1 is unable to choose to do otherwise. If we attribute Ernie the 
ability to choose, as Mele does in premise (2), we must commit to holding fixed the facts about 
his dispositions in any test cases.  
 Any appeal to the fact that Diana would have designed Ernie differently if the facts had 
been different makes the same mistake that Frankfurt makes in arguing that Jones was unable to 
do otherwise because Black would have changed facts about his psychology had he chosen (or 
had he begun to choose) to do otherwise. The fact that his abilities would have been altered if 
things were different merely means that his abilities are finkish, not that he lacked the ability to 
choose. A dispositional account of free will thus provides grounds for taking a hard-line response 
towards Mele’s zygote argument. On a dispositional account of free will, the fact that Ernie is 
able to make decisions entails that he could have chosen to do otherwise, even if Diana would 
have acted differently had things been different. Premise (1) is false, counterintuitive as that 















I have argued that a dispositional account of free will is best able to defeat manipulation 
arguments by focusing on the fact that some manipulation cases depict agents whose rational 
abilities are masked. The presence of a mask is a better explanation for a manipulated agent’s 
lack of moral responsibility than causal determinism is. In such cases, there is a difference 
relevant to moral responsibility between the manipulated agent and the causally determined 
agent. Should cases be altered such that the manipulated agent’s abilities are not masked, the 
cases will lose any theoretical ground for the intuition that the manipulated agent is not morally 
responsible. Some cases require that we decide whether to assess a time period that includes the 
manipulation itself, but the fact that analyzing abilities and masks requires a temporal index 
means that whether a wider time period is appropriate has no bearing on the success of a 
dispositional account of free will. 
 The account of masks that I have developed here can be used to strengthen a dispositional 
account of free will beyond simply allowing for a response to manipulation arguments. Though it 
departs in some respects from the orthodoxy on masks, in that it requires an account of masks as 
gradable, such a change is necessary on an account of dispositions according to which 
dispositions are gradable. A principled account of masks such as mine will allow for a stronger 
form of dispositional compatibilism; with an understanding of the factors that should be held 
fixed across possible worlds, we can more easily identify the cases in which agents were able to 
do otherwise. Beyond the free will debate, masks are a significant problem; they are central to 




forthcoming). Further, questions about bias in reasoning and whether one can be morally 
responsible for one’s bias are heavily impacted by the nature of masks. There are also potential 
implications for the law; as noted above, the defense of not guilty by reason of insanity depends 
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